Lebanon: imperialist penetration and anti-imperialist contradictions – part 2

In the second of three articles on Lebanon Jade Saab outlines the development of anti-Zionist resistance from 1948 through to the present day.

The first section in this three-part series of articles explained how Lebanon’s sectarian system emerged under Ottoman and French rule and occupation. This system was reinscribed after Lebanon’s independence in 1943, which solidified a nexus of connections between domestic and international sectarian capitalism. The article argued that this nexus is characterised by an absence of centralised power within the state, reducing it into a clearinghouse in which resources are distributed among the different sectarian/political groupings and imperial powers. When these interests cannot be settled within the state, they break out into civil war or smaller skirmishes as they did in 1958, 1975, and 2008. These breaks all ended in political settlements that did not fundamentally transform the Lebanese political system.

This article illustrates how this sectarian system allowed for and altered resistance to Israel from within Lebanon. By providing a brief historical overview of anti-Zionist resistance in Lebanon, the article explains how this resistance shifted from one with secular and socialist overtones to the Islamic, state-embedded resistance existing today. For ease, the article breaks down this history into three periods. The first, from 1948 to 1982 where socialist secular movements dominated the resistance. The second, from 1982 to 2006 saw Hezbollah secure its monopoly over the resistance. The final, from 2006 to the present where Hezbollah proved to be an indispensable section of the Lebanese state.

Emergence of a secular resistance 

Arab life in the 1950s, 60s and 70s was dominated by the rise of Pan-Arabism following the Egyptian revolution of 1952 and Gamal Abdel Nasser. While officially unaligned to either of the Cold War camps, Abdel Nasser benefited from Soviet support and Pan-Arabism, espoused broad socialist values such as state ownership, economic sovereignty, and equality, and centred anti-imperialism as manifested in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973.

The rise of Pan-Arabism coincided with that of Palestinian self-organisation. Where the Palestinian cause was previously championed by different Arab countries with competing interests, the emergence of an independent Palestinian voice through the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (FATAH) in 1959, and then the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) which brought several Palestinian parties together in 1964, galvanised Palestinians and gave them voice to determine their methods and objectives. 

Lebanon was not immune from either of these movements. In 1958, Egypt and Syria merged into the United Arab Republic as a first step towards the establishment of a greater Pan-Arab state. Iraq overthrew its king and established a republic. In Lebanon, growing support for the Pan-Arab project resulted in mobilisation against the country’s president who had aligned himself with the US. Clashes erupted and Lebanon’s President called in 17,000 US marines as part of the Eisenhower doctrine, which pledged military support to any country which feared a communist takeover. The 1958 crisis ended with the election of the head of the Lebanese Army as President. The head of the army refused to take sides during the crisis, instead, deploying troops to act as a buffer between the two sides. As such, he was seen as a neutral consensus leader preserving Lebanon’s status quo. Although his election ended the crisis, 1958 represented the first crack in the foundation of Lebanon’s political system until it became a glaring break when the country descended into Civil War in 1975.

Between 1958 and 1975, the Palestinian movement also gained ground in Lebanon. In 1948 about 100,000 Palestinians settled in Lebanon following their expulsion during the Nakba. These Palestinians were placed in refugee camps where they, until today, are treated as second-class citizens. The refugee camps became fertile recruitment grounds for FATAH and other groups of the PLO. Soon enough Palestinian resistance factions were launching operations into occupied Palestine from the South of Lebanon. In 1968, in response to these attacks, Israel bombed Beirut International Airport destroying the entire civilian fleet of the national airline. 

Increased Palestinian militancy in Lebanon raised the question of “sovereignty” and several clashes between the Lebanese Army and Palestinian factions took place in 1968 and 1969. This increased political polarisation in the country, between those who supported the Palestinian cause, and those who saw their presence in Lebanon as a threat to the future of the country and its delicate sectarian balance. The political question was settled in 1969 when Gamal Abdul Nasser proposed, and Lebanon accepted, the Cairo Agreement. This agreement provided Palestinians with autonomy and self-rule within refugee camps and the right to launch operations into occupied Palestine from Lebanese land. 1969 also saw the formation of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) headed by the leader of the Lebanese Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). The LNM joined various secular and socialist parties in a political parliamentary and extra-parliamentary block to support the Palestinian cause, coordinate various labour and civil struggles, and hoped to establish a secular republic in Lebanon. 

In 1970, the PLO moved to Lebanon after their violent expulsion from Jordan in the events of Black September. By the following year, Lebanon had become their sole operating base. This development did not go unchallenged. Worried by the increased activity of Palestinian factions in Lebanon, right-wing political parties began to form their own militias to “save” Lebanon from what they saw as foreign intervention and maintain Christian domination in the state. The friction and limited street battles between the LNM and the PLO on one side, and right-wing militias, which would soon organise into the Lebanese Front (LF), eventually broke out into a full-scale Civil War in 1975 which would not officially end until 1989. Until 1982, an uneasy alliance formed between the PLO and the LNM. The PLO’s objective was to liberate Palestine, but its position in Lebanon depended on the success of the LNM in establishing a secular state, or at least the failure of the LF in removing the autonomy the PLO had gained through the Cairo agreement. 

In 1978, in response to attacks from Lebanon, Israel invaded the south of the country to establish a buffer zone, the same political goal it claims for its invasion today. The invasion was short but it led to the creation of the South Lebanon Army, a Lebanese militia that Israel trained and funded to fight against the Palestinian presence in the South of Lebanon. The invasion also led to the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) who were sent in to confirm Israel’s withdrawal and assist the Lebanese government (existent only in name due to the civil war) in enforcing its authority across the “blue line”, the defacto border between Lebanon and Occupied Palestine. The SLA would remain in the south and become the civilian authority in the buffer zone established by Israel following the 1982 invasion until the liberation of the south in the year 2000.

The rise of Hezbollah

Israel’s failure to achieve its political goals in 1978 led it to invade Lebanon once again in 1982. This time, it did not stop at the south but occupied half of it, reaching and encircling Beirut. The invasion was aimed at and succeeded in expelling the PLO from Lebanon. A Multinational Force (MNF) of American, French, British, and Italian army personnel oversaw the evacuation of the PLO after which Israel was meant to retreat. The latter would not happen before the Sabra and Shatila Massacre.

With the PLO and armed Palestinian presence virtually absent in Beirut, Israel surrounded the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. There, and for three days, the Israeli army illuminated the night sky with flares as right-wing Lebanese militias, who had been supported and supplied by the US and Israel throughout the war, entered the camp and massacred its Palestinian and Lebanese inhabitants. How many were killed across those days is unclear, but estimates range from 1,500 to more than 3,000 in what is considered the darkest chapter of the Lebanese Civil War.

The expulsion of the PLO left Lebanon at a crossroads. Left-wing secular parties were weakened as they found themselves absent an important ally which provided access to resources, manpower, and diplomatic connections. Nevertheless, a new national resistance had come into play: the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF) reorganised most of the parties found within the LNM with the direct aim of expelling Israel from Beirut and Lebanon. While the group carried out many resistance operations across the country, they were overshadowed by the creation of Hezbollah in the same year.

Hezbollah was formed by a breakaway group from an older political party, Amal. Inspired and supported by the new Iranian regime which gained power following the 1978 Iranian Revolution, Hezbollah sought to establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon and believed in armed resistance to Israel. In 1983 and 1984, Hezbollah carried out suicide truck bombings against the MNF barracks in Beirut and twice against the US embassy. These bombings led to the withdrawal of the MNF altogether. 

Throughout the Civil War, Hezbollah was able to outmanoeuvre the smaller LNRF and has been accused of assassinating leadership figures in secular and leftist organisations. Worth mentioning here is Mehdi Amel (pseudonym of Hassan Hamdan), the foremost theoretician of the Lebanese Communist Party and member of its central committee. A month before Amel was gunned down in Beirut in 1987, Hezbollah’s weekly periodical directly threatened his life, warning that “his turn has come”. Hezbollah, like the Iranian revolution before it, saw the Communists and Socialists as the primary threat to their vision of an Islamic state and the largest obstacle to gaining a foothold in Lebanon and a monopoly over the resistance. 

The Civil War was ended in 1989 through the signing of the Taif Agreement by all major political parties. By then, Hezbollah was able to secure itself a defacto and legal monopoly over resistance in Lebanon. The Taif agreement was predicated on the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, limited the powers of the Christian president, and increased the number of seats in parliament to allow for a 1:1 parity between Muslim and Christian representatives, thus maintaining the country’s sectarian system. Hezbollah was excluded from disarmament in its capacity as a resistance force, thus providing it with a similar autonomy of operation in Lebanon as the PLO had following the Cairo Agreement – except for refugee camps which remained self-governing.

From 1989 to 2000, Hezbollah used this autonomy to continue its operations against Israel which occupied a “buffer zone” in the south of Lebanon with the support of the SLA. Hezbollah also renounced its initial goal of establishing an Islamic Republic in Lebanon and began participating in Lebanese political life including parliamentary, municipal, and other civil elections quickly securing political legitimacy with a popular base of support. 

In response to Hezbollah guerilla operations and rocket fire into Occupied Palestine, Israel launched a military offensive against Lebanon in 1996. During this operation, Israel shelled a UN base in Qana killing more than 100 Lebanese civilians who had sought refuge there. In scenes similar to those we are seeing from Gaza today, the body parts of civilians were laid out on tables following the strikes so they could be matched to other parts in the hopes that a full body could be buried. One of the most shocking scenes of the massacre was the retrieval of a toddler missing its head. In the year 2000, following continuous guerilla operations against Israeli forces in the South, Israel unilaterally withdrew from the country and the SLA collapsed with many of its members leaving to Israel.

Hezbollah enjoyed great popular support following the liberation of the south. However, questions began to emerge about the need for an autonomous resistance group now that Lebanon was free. Popular support quickly changed in 2005 following a string of assassinations targeting reformist and secular figures in Lebanon. This included the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri who was seen as instrumental in the Taif Agreement, and George Hawi, the leader of the LCP and one of the founders of the LNRF, among other journalists and political figures. 

The assassination of the PM led to the Cedar Revolution which successfully expelled the Syrian Army from Lebanon. The Syrian Army was stationed in Lebanon in a “caretaker” capacity following the Civil War. For many, their presence represented an occupation and their departure was an opportunity for a new political start. The Cedar Revolution divided the country into two opposing camps, one led by Hezbollah, and the other by “reformist” but mostly neo-liberal parties. 

These political concerns were quickly overshadowed by the 2006 war and invasion of the South of Lebanon following Hezbollah’s abduction of Israeli soldiers from across the “blue line”. The 2006 war saw Israel adopt the “Dahiya Doctrine”. Named after a densely populated suburb south of Beirut, the Dahiye Doctrine sought to “wield disproportionate power and cause immense damage and destruction” to the civilian infrastructure of Lebanon. The objective of this destruction was not meant to have immediate results, but also “such a response aims at inflicting damage and meting out punishment to an extent that will demand long and expensive reconstruction processes”. Part of this doctrine was to erase the distinction between civilian and military sites, the doctrine claimed that “Every one of the Shiite villages [referencing Hezbollah’s sectarian support base] is a military site, with headquarters, an intelligence centre, and a communications centre. Dozens of rockets are buried in houses, basements, attics, and the village is run by Hezbollah men.”

The 2006 war was ended by UN Resolution 1701 which mandated that Hezbollah retreat beyond the Litani River, which has been seen as the geographic boundary to a buffer zone by Israel since 1978. It is worth noting that Resolution 1701 constitutes the main axis of negotiation for a ceasefire deal in Lebanon today. Hezbollah did not comply with 1701 citing Israeli breaches of Lebanese airspace as evidence that they were not abiding by it either. For many, the 2006 war was a resounding victory for Hezbollah. They successfully repelled Israel’s advance into Lebanon causing them heavy losses including damaging one of their warships illustrating their military capabilities. Hezbollah was also able to secure the release of remaining Lebanese prisoners in exchange for the Israeli soldiers they were able to capture. 

Resistance or state apparatus? 

While many saw the 2006 war as a military success, its heavy toll on Lebanon emboldened opposition to Hezbollah’s autonomy. In 2008, the Lebanese government, composed of those opposed to this autonomy passed a law to dismantle Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network. Seeing this as a threat to its existence, Hezbollah deployed its fighters in the streets of Beirut and other cities leading to street battles which raged for days leaving an estimated 300 dead. This political crisis was ended by the Doha Agreement which stipulated the creation of a national unity government and the election of a President of Hezbollah’s preference ending the political deadlock for the election of a new president. 

Following the events of 2008, Hezbollah continued developing its political position in Lebanon in a way congruent with the neoliberal interests of other parties. Hezbollah helped weaken the power of unions, expanded its involvement in property development, and weakened workers in agricultural sectors in favour of extractive practice. The intertwinement of the Party with the state has even led to it endorsing state plans which contradict its role as the resistance. For example, Hezbollah argued that the Lebanese government should engage with IMF advisors on the topic of restructuring the economy. It also did not block the Lebanese government’s agreement to the US-led settlement of the maritime border dispute with Israel which saw the country forgo its access to critical gas resources.

The state’s neoliberal policies, endorsed by Hezbollah, led to the rise of anti-sectarian groups and networks which saw the political system as the source of Lebanon’s poor economic performance, widespread corruption, and other social ills. Mass mobilisation against the government first took place in 2011, in tandem with the “Arab Spring”, calling for the end of Lebanon’s sectarian power-sharing system. In 2015, following the closure of one of Lebanon’s largest landfills, the YouStink movement mobilised thousands against the state’s ineptness to find a solution other than converting major highways into dumps leading to an ecological crisis. These protests largely aimed at the garbage crisis quickly transformed into calls for abolishing the sectarian system, before the protests were suppressed. The largest mobilisations occurred in 2019 as Lebanon entered an acute financial crisis it has yet to exit. The 2019 revolution produced the popular slogan “All of them means all of them” identifying all traditional political parties, including Hezbollah, as complicit in creating Lebanon’s economic and political problems.

Across all of these protests, Hezbollah’s role was either neutral or as a pillar of support for the state and the confessional system on which its autonomy is predicated. Most notably, during the 2019 revolution, Hezbollah’s members mobilised to clear the public squares, street blockades, and revolution tents occupied and erected by protesters across the country. The onset of the Covid pandemic and the implementation of martial law demobilised the 2019 revolution but it was further demobilised by the devastating Beirut port explosion of 2020. Hezbollah proved itself an indispensable ally in preserving the sectarian system across all of these popular mobilisations and the financial crisis only furthered its entrenchment within its support base. This is because its already-established autonomy provided it with the infrastructure needed to maintain and expand its clientelist networks despite economic collapse. Hezbollah supporters were able to access social, financial, and health services closed off to Lebanese citizens who were not affiliated with any of the traditional parties. Instead, Lebanese citizens were left to contend with hyperinflation, power cuts, and capital controls imposed on them by the banks.  

It is this political landscape on which today’s war is being fought. The next and final installation in this series explores how current contradictions can be utilised to help build a popular resistance. This includes conceptualising the role the left can play beyond answering the abstract question of supporting ‘the resistance,’ and how the concept of resistance itself can be used to revive the left in the imperialist core.

Jade Saab is editor and contributor to A Region In Revolt: mapping the recent uprisings in North Africa and West Asia. Available for £10 plus postage from rs21.