Lebanon: imperialist penetration and anti-imperialist contradictions 

In the first part of a new series on the histories of anti-imperialist resistance in Lebanon, Jade Saab gives an overview of the ‘confessional’ political system in Lebanon, and how this institutionalises sectarianism.

As the genocide in Gaza continues, Israel’s intensification of its regional war has again pushed Lebanon into the front line. Media outlets are presenting the war as one between Israel and Hezbollah, which suits Israel’s interests in parading Hezbollah as something separate from the Lebanese people and the Lebanese state. Indeed, the press is flush with coverage of Hezbollah’s position as a ‘quasi-state’ actor, which an Israeli minister has used to argue that Lebanon is not a sovereign state. This justifies any intervention that the Israeli state sees fit. 

For the left, the expansion of the war in Lebanon has raised an important question: should we stand in solidarity with what has been an effective anti-imperialist resistance movement, even if it manifests itself in a reactionary and religiously-driven organisation such as Hezbollah? Both the Israeli (which currently represents the dominant narrative) and some left positions reduce reality to false binaries, which ignore the role of the Lebanese political structure and the practical responsibilities we have as agents in the imperialist core. This series of three articles aims to move beyond such false binaries by situating the history of Lebanese resistance in its political context and presenting a clearer image of opportunities for advancing a united socialist resistance here and abroad. 

This first article in the series explains the nature of Lebanon’s sectarian political system, which is integral to understanding the rise of Hezbollah. The second article will give a brief historical overview of anti-Zionist resistance in Lebanon, explaining the shift from a secular and socialist resistance which dominated the 70s to the Islamic, state-embedded resistance we have today. The final article in the series will reflect on the role of the left beyond the abstract question of supporting ‘the resistance,’ and how the concept of resistance can be used to revive the left in the imperialist core.

The Lebanese political context: sectarianism and multiple sovereignty

Lebanon’s current borders were established following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War 1. Lebanon, along with what is now Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, were first occupied by the French and British in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement against the wishes and promise of Arab national self-determination across these territories.

These occupations were legitimised in 1923 when the League of Nations provided France and Britain with mandates over the territories they held. By then, France had already fundamentally changed the geography of Lebanon by doubling its size from the previously autonomous area of ‘Mount Lebanon,’ to include the former Ottoman districts of Tripoli, Sidon, and the Bekaa Valley into a ‘greater Lebanon’. These changes reflected both international and domestic aspirations. For France, a greater Lebanon would weaken a future independent Syrian state. For Lebanese, particularly the Christian population of Mount Lebanon, a greater Lebanon would provide it with the land resources and infrastructure needed for self-sufficiency and avoid a repeat of the great famine of 1915-1918 in which more than nearly half of the population perished. These land gains were seen as worthwhile despite making the Christian population a minority.

Lebanon not only inherited its current borders from the French, but also a system of sectarian democracy. In 1943, this system was enshrined in Lebanon’s national pact and constitution following its independence. The national pact expanded on the French confessional constitution of 1926. The pact, negotiated between Muslim and Christian leaders of Lebanon, agreed to maintain religious representation in the Lebanese Parliament at a ratio of 6:5 favouring Christians based on a census conducted under French mandate. More importantly, the pact accepted Lebanon’s mandate borders, abandoning any aspirations to revert to a greater Arab state or unification with Syria.

The National Pact and Lebanon’s confessional system is often wrongfully presented as an imposition by the French. However, the system emerged during Ottoman rule to put an end to fighting between Mount Lebanon’s various religious groups. These wars, which took place between the 1840s and 1860s, are best described as peasant uprisings against feudal privileges and an economic shift towards cash crop production. The wars also reflected proxy conflicts between the Ottoman Empire, the British, and the French, each backing certain factions to protect or expand their interests in the area. 

These wars were put to an end by establishing a new political system in which a governor, a Mutasarrif, would be appointed by the Ottoman Empire but would need to be approved by the other colonial powers. Assisting the governor would be 12 councillors, two from each religious community (Maronites, Druze, Sunni, Shi’a, Greek Orthodox, and Melkite). This confessional system created a two-way relationship between feudal and capitalist representatives in Lebanon and their international sponsors. These links remained post-independence. Although Lebanon emerged as ‘sovereign,’ it kept a social and political structure which protected the privileged position of established families who could trace their power back to the feudal and administrative power structures established under Ottoman rule and their corresponding international links. 

The implications of this set-up are simple: independent Lebanon never emerged with one centre of power but existed and continues to exist in a de facto state of multiple sovereignty. The Lebanese state became, as it was before and continues to be, a site in which the interests of different politico-capitalists and imperial powers are settled. When these interests cannot be settled within the state, they break out into civil war or smaller skirmishes often ending in political settlements that do not fundamentally transform the Lebanese political system. It is for these reasons that the main political actors in Lebanon consist of legacy political families, politicians who have emerged during or through intensified periods of political conflict, and an extended network of domestic-international capitalism which intersects with political power. 

Lebanon’s political system has also shaped its economy. Its historic interlacing with imperial interests has resulted in little development of productive capacities, which creates a great bias towards a model of rentierism and extractivism centred around financial services, import/export, and property development. What little natural resources Lebanon has (quarries, fertile land, natural water resources) have been privatised, given over to foreign companies under domestic decree, or squandered as a result of political bickering.

This nexus of domestic/international sectarian capitalism and the absence of a centralised power in the state has made it difficult for popular movements to develop in a way that pushes Lebanon beyond its current system. At a basic level, this structure makes it difficult to build a generalised consensus on what or who is the cause of any ills the people of Lebanon might face. Even when such popular movements emerge, as they did in the 70’s and again in 2019, international intervention or domestic division terminate them prematurely. Despite these challenges, a de facto state of multiple sovereignty also presents opportunities. A divided state means that coercive apparatuses are wielded inefficiently, creating opportunities for the creation of new centres of power if done correctly. The emergence of Hezbollah in 1982 provides such an example.  

There is no doubt that the Lebanese political and economic context is unique to the country, however, it is important to avoid the trap of exceptionalism. The function of the state as an arena for settling differences between dominant groups is something shared across all capitalist countries. This does not make the Lebanese state any less ‘sovereign’, but requires a different understanding of sovereignty, as a practice of managing differences in a country where capitalism has developed in an unequal and dispersed manner along sectarian lines. Further, this is within a global capitalist system in which Lebanon is subordinate to imperialist powers. 

The next article in the series will explore how this nexus of domestic/international sectarian capitalism shaped the history of resistance in Lebanon.